Introduction
I increasingly feel… like a kind of race and ethnicity dinosaur… standing still while all these new and sexy topics are kind of rushing around me and getting lots of funding.
Claire Alexander (2014) In the past half-century race equality has rocked back and forth between the margins and the centre of education policy in England. How do educators with longstanding commitment to race equality perceive this ebb and flow? Sociologist Claire Alexander made the selfdeprecating 'dinosaur' remark during a recent seminar on the voguish topic of super-diversity (Alexander and Arday, 2015) and it is hard not to sympathise with the mood of the dinosaur, the race equality veteran confronted by upstart theories and issues. In England race equality in education policy has historically been bound up with the wider role of state multiculturalism. However, in the 21 st Century state multiculturalism is routinely depicted as an anachronism. For some commentators, state multiculturalism has been counter-productive, encouraging ethnic divisions and white resentment (see, for example, Goodhart 2013; Phillips, 2016) . Others argue, either more optimistically or more disingenuously, that racism has declined in social salience and that multiculturalism in education and other areas of public provision is outmoded (Mirza, 2010) . Commenting on this turn, Gilroy (2004) has argued that the political disavowal of state multiculturalism is rooted in a 'growing sense that it is now illegitimate to believe that multiculture can and should be orchestrated by government in the public interest' (Gilroy, 2004 : 1).
Alexander's 'dinosaur' quip hinges on a distinction between the 'old' and the 'new'.
However, in policy the 'old' and the 'new' are always discursive products, politically determined. Garner (2010) and Warmington (2015) have noted that the depiction of state multiculturalism as anachronistic is a distinctive feature in contemporary debates in England.
For while, on the political right, multiculturalism has long been a folk demon, the emphasis on the anachronistic nature of state multiculturalism has provided an umbrella wherein critics of multiculturalism across the political spectrum can distance themselves from charges of being reactionary or racist, and can instead locate themselves as forward-looking. The depiction of state multiculturalism as outmoded allows the possibility that it might once have been a necessary evil, but no longer. David Cameron, Conservative prime minister between 4 2010 and 2016, declared of state multiculturalism that 'it is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past' (Cameron, 2011) . However, Chakrabortty (2010) has suggested that claims about the decline of racism are more a rhetorical claim to 'newness' and political vitality than a factual description of current social relationships.
Significance of the paper
This paper explores the personal reflections of interviewees -each of whom has longstanding involvement in the field of race equality -upon the shifting status of race equality in education policy in England over the twenty years between 1993 and 2013. The interview participants included some of the most influential figures in race equality work in England during that period. Their standpoints were diverse and their analyses of what drove race equality policy in education varied. Some emphasised the active role of BME communities coupled with governments' concern with being seen to respond to social discontent; others depicted government policy as a rational, evidence-based response (for example, to data on achievement gaps). However, the participants' narratives converged in a largely pessimistic view of 1993-2013 as a period in which the race equality in education policy built in momentum, touched the policy mainstream -and then failed. By the end of the New Labour administration (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and the start of the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Coalition government (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) explicit focus on race equality in education had, in the views of participants, been diminished; there was no longer a language in which to address race equality, to locate it within governance or within political values.
Part of the significance of this paper is its focus on the perspectives of actors who have 'hinterland', who have witnessed shifts and cycles in race equality policy over time, and who have had degrees of direct involvement in policy-making and enactment. The participants include educators; community activists; third sector workers and trade unionists. Some have held multiple roles: for example, teachers who have also taken on civil service roles; academics who have also been involved in producing policy reports or in community campaigning. Across the course of their professional lives, such actors may have moved between the margins and the centre of the policy world, depending on the wider political mood. They are, as it were, 'old hands' in the field and practice of race equality.
The value of these stakeholders' voices may be understood in terms of phronesis. The Greek term for practical judgement, wisdom and intelligence has been reclaimed by sociocultural 5 theorists such as Avis (2016) to describe how critical understandings of particular fields and practices may derive from the longevity of actors' practical experience. It refers to the kinds of situated knowledge that supports judgements embedded in 'complexity and indeterminacy at the site of practice' (Avis, 2016: 53) . In short, the participants who contributed to this paper draw on knowledge that enables them to treat race not merely as a short-term policy
item but with what Apple (2001: 204) has termed 'due recognition of its complexity … (as) a set of fully social relationships.'
In exploring articulations between race and education, the position of this paper is one of race ambivalence (Leonardo, 2005) . For while race may be 'unreal' in the sense that it is not a coherent scientific category, its effects or 'modes of existence' (Leonardo, 2005: 409) are real. In other words, we live as if race has meaning; we live race in practice, experiencing the world in ways that are mediated by racialised social categories and relationships. Race in practice has innumerable consequences and while race intersects with other social identities, it is not sufficient merely to regard race as technology of other supposedly more 'real' relationships, such as class. Nor should research on race and education treat race as a social identity that simply exists prior to the field of education; racial identities and divisions are also produced within educational sites (including policy). It is in this sense that race is a social construction, a social relationship.
Methods and methodology
The material analysed in the current paper derives from interviews conducted during a twoyear research study funded by the Society for Educational Studies. The Race, Racism and Education (RRE) study was conducted between 2013 and 2015 (in the second half of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government). It focused on education in England during the twenty-year span, 1993-2013, and its aims were twofold. Firstly, there was an interview-based strand, examining perceptions of the changing status of race equality in education policy (which is the focus of the current paper). Secondly, there was a quantitative strand, charting attainment and progression among black and minority ethnic students in compulsory, post-compulsory and higher education (covered extensively in Gillborn et al, forthcoming) .
For the interview strand, selection of participants followed a 'key informant' model, wherein participants were selected because of their involvement in developing, enacting and 6 evaluating race equality policy in education during the period 1993 -2013. In order to provide diversity, at the point of recruitment participants were nominally categorised as 'politicians'
(for instance, former education ministers), 'senior policy-makers' (for instance, civil servants with cabinet-level involvement) and 'stakeholders'. The latter group included practitioners involved in educational leadership, community activism, the third sector, academia and trade unions. There was overlap between categories of participant: for example, there were trade unionists and academics who had been involved in government advisory groups and in producing policy reports. The importance of the 'stakeholder' group, who feature in the current paper, was that their participation ensured the study included practitioners with lengthy involvement in race and education, in some cases dating back as far as the 1970s and 1980s. This distinguished them from participants whose focus on race and education was relatively short-term. It also helped us to understand policy not only in terms of top-down government but also in terms of enactment at local levels (cf. Ball et al, 2012) . Given the number of people nationally that might potentially have fit our key informant criteria, the 'sample' was inevitably small in scale but we were confident that it included some of the most notable figures active in race equality work during the period, including participants with decades of work in the field.
Thirty-five interviews were conducted in the RRE research study. Twenty-two interviewees were from BME groups (8 female, 14 male); thirteen were white British (5 female, 8 male).
The current paper focuses principally on interviews with around twenty participants whom we defined at the point of recruitment as 'stakeholders'. The interviews were semi-structured, in-depth and generally lasted between forty minutes and ninety minutes. Organising themes included interviewees' perceptions of landmarks in race equality in education and in the wider public sphere between 1993 and 2013; their involvement in education policy initiatives; their views on persistent inequalities in education; and their understandings of the influence of concepts such as cultural diversity and institutional racism on education policy.
Interviews were fully transcribed and were analysed using a constant comparative method as a means identifying recurrent constructs (Thomas, 2009 ). This thematic analysis enabled reconstruction of participants' analyses of the shifting status of race equality in education policy. Given that the interviews concerned views on government and policy, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity were salient issues. All participants were informed that the RRE study focused on shifts in the place of race equality in education policy. With 7 three exceptions (the interviewees referred to as 'Jo', 'Celia' and 'Howard'), the participants were willing to permit their real names to be used in reporting the research (.
In terms of methodology, the interviews were used as means to access the meanings that participants ascribed to their experiences of changes in race and education policy over time.
Interviews were not viewed in idealised terms, as offering 'authentic' perspectives on policy history and contexts but as 'situated elements in social worlds' (Silverman, 2004: 4) , narrative accounts ordered by the interviewees in order to produce representations. In short, the interviews were understood as local accomplishments, joint constructions produced by interviewer and interviewee (cf. Silverman, 2004) . As such, it was necessary to acknowledge the forces mediating interviewees' voices: in particular, the retrospective nature of interviewees' accounts. However, such factors notwithstanding, our analytic standpoint was that interviewing provided credible access to the ways in which participants understood their social worlds.
Education policy context, 1993-2013
In exploring participants' retrospective views of a twenty-year period, the current paper comprises a form of oral history -and memory and hindsight play complex roles in historical research. The participants were asked to cast their minds back as far as 1993. That year is a significant marker in the history of race in England because of the racist murder of
Stephen Lawrence. The Lawrence family's subsequent campaign for justice secured a public inquiry (Macpherson, 1999) (Gillard, 2011) . Education Secretary Chris Patten laid out a commitment to expanding selection in the secondary school system, to providing 'choice' and 'diversity' for parents and to addressing falling standards in literacy and numeracy. These principles formed the basis of the Education Act (1993) (Benn, 2011) .
In 1997 a Labour government was returned to power in the UK for the first time in eighteen years. Refashioning the party as 'New Labour', Prime Minister Tony Blair famously announced the new government's priority as 'Education, education, education!' Summarising the scope of New Labour's education policy in a short space is unfeasible. However, Jones (2003) describes the fundamentals of New Labour's education policy as diversity of educational provision combined with a forceful regulatory system that aimed at increasing average attainment (see also Ball, 2008; Sammons, 2008) . Embedded in a discourse of quality, accountability and standards but also with putative concern for social inclusion, New
Labour's period of government (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) included measures such as the initiation of the National College for School Leadership, Education Action Zones, the Every Child Matters strategy, the academies programme and, in 2005, a five-year strategy that mentioned BME pupils just once (Ball, 2008) .
The relative absence of race as an issue in the five-year strategy reflects the extent to which, by the early 21 st Century, issues of race equality and multiculturalism had become 'toxic' (in the words of interviewee Professor Sally Tomlinson, whose research on race and education dates back to her pioneering work with John Rex in the 1970s). Post-9/11, national and global antagonisms influenced education and social policy, and shaped wider debates on race equality and cultural diversity. Key events in England included 2001's disturbances in northern English towns (which news media sensationalised as 'race riots'); the London bombings of 7/7/2005; widespread urban rest in the summer of 2011, and increased media focus on immigration levels. All of these fed into popular anxieties about multiculturalism, 'self-segregation', radicalisation of young Muslims and perceived 'urban' lawlessness.
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The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government that succeeded Labour in 2010 saw educational reform largely in terms of reshaping school structures, building on New
Labour's concern with parental choice and diversity of provision, through the expansion of the academies programme and the introduction of free schools. Although social mobility remained a discursive motif (with increasing focus on low achievement among white working-class pupils), 2011 saw the abolition of Labour's Education Maintenance Allowance, a scheme designed to encourage 16-19 year olds to stay on in education. As for curriculum content, Wrigley (2015) has argued that Education Secretary (2010 Secretary ( -2014 Michael Gove's concern with refocusing on 'core' subjects largely expunged any focus on cultural diversity (a claim also made by several of the interviewees).
Mainstreaming race equality
…if you looked back at the 1960s and 70s and wherever you were then, you would say we are further on than then, but we have been further on than we are now… It's gone up and dipped and gone up and dipped. And I would say at the moment it's dipping.
(Sir Tim Brighouse, Senior Education Officer)
How did the stakeholder participants depict changes in the positioning of race equality in education policy? What did they identify as the 'ups' and the 'dips' of the 1993-2013 period?
In terms of the impact of race equality concerns on education policy, three historic policy moments were repeatedly identified, salient moments at which race equality work was 'mainstreamed'.
The first of these comprised policy measures explicitly aimed at closing ethnic achievement gaps in schools. These began in piecemeal, local fashion in the early 1990s and were sustained by later strategies, such as the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (1999 Grant ( -2011 , the London Challenge (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) and its extension, City Challenge (2008 Challenge ( -2011 . Secondly, there was the diversity and citizenship agenda that featured in New Labour's final term (Ajegbo et al, 2007) . This was arguably a late incarnation of the citizenship reviews and reports on community cohesion that emerged in response to 9/11 and the urban unrest in northern English cities in 2001 (e.g. Ouseley, 2001; Cantle, 2001) . Thirdly, interviewees referred to the impact of the Macpherson Report (1999) , which reclaimed the concept of 'institutional racism', and the statutory duties introduced in the subsequent Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000).
The first thing to note is that the stakeholders -including several who had been involved in policy and advisory roles -tended to reject strongly the idea that government policy was consistently committed to addressing race equality. Retrospectively, they depicted the period 2003-2013 in terms of a downward arc of emergence, momentum and retreat: apparent, for instance, in the rolling back of Macpherson's focus on institutional racism. A second thing to note is the dissonance in participants' accounts of what drove race equality policy. Those more closely aligned with community activism tended to see government action as a response to wider social antagonisms, to community demands and urban unrest. Those who had been closely involved in top-down policy, however, sometimes offered more positivistic accounts, depicting policy as being evidence-driven and emphasising the role of performance data in convincing ministers of the need for action on racial inequalities in education.
'Bottom up' and 'top down'
Research on race and education in the UK has argued that government action has often been a belated response to community campaigning or urban unrest (Grosvenor, 1997; Warmington, 2014) . In the 1970s ILEA's work on multicultural education was a response to a decade and more of campaigning by London's black communities and by anti-racist teachers. In the I call them the disturbances of the 80s; I didn't call it riots …black youngsters were saying enough is enough …they took to the streets …and (under) the Tories, the education of black people then came more to the fore and policies began to be made because they knew they had problems.
(Maxie Hayles, human rights activist)
What Hayles points to here is the dynamic that critical race theorists describe as 'interest convergence' (Bell, 1980) . Based on analysis of US civil rights legislation, interest convergence suggests that apparently progressive moves in race equality are most likely be secured where they secure the interests of white elites as well as accommodating the demands of black communities. However, those progressive policies become vulnerable and prone to retreat when they cease to converge with elite interests. Gillborn (2014) has noted that the notion of interest convergence is frequently misunderstood. It does not 'envisage a rational and balanced negotiation between minoritized groups and white power holders, where change is achieved through the mere force of reason and logic. History suggests that advances in racial justice must be won through political protest and mobilisation that create a situation where -for white interests -taking some action against racism becomes the lesser of two evils' (Gillborn, 2014: 29) .
Among some interviewees, particularly those with backgrounds in community activism and those from BME backgrounds, there was a tendency to describe race equality policies as examples of government needing to be seen to act in response to campaigning and crisis. For example, 'Celia' (pseudonym), who described herself as a 'civil servant' but had longstanding involvement in race equality in schools, commented that calls for government action on race equality in the 1990s:
…really reached its crescendo after Stephen Lawrence was killed …governments …need to respond to that …they can't just ignore it …because it was such a major event, there was a need to respond to that.
'Celia' (civil servant and academic)
Academic and trade union activist, Professor Gargi Bhattacharyya referred to race equality policy having been driven by 'many years of intensive activity and a great deal of quite heroic work by ordinary people in ordinary communities.' Among policy-makers, Peter Educational consultant Inderjit Dehal, who as a senior civil servant at DfES with a particular concern for race equality, led the London Challenge initiative and its regional extension, the City Challenge, also argued that the evidence on pupil performance convinced education ministers to address ethnic gaps in achievement. Labour's 'high performance/ high equity' approach (see, for example, DfES, 2005) aspired to improve general achievement, while simultaneously minimising gaps between the highest achieving and 'underachieving' groups (see critiques by e.g. Archer and Francis, 2007; Ball, 2008) .
…it became a national issue, the whole notion of gap-closing …it registered with ministers …because we were then able to shine a light on individual school performance and individual pupil performance …For the first time, we were able to …get schools and ministers to do something about it.
(Inderjit Dehal, educational consultant, ex-DfES)
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In these reflections education policy is seen as being at least partially self-regulating, with data 'speaking for itself' (cf. . There is less emphasis on the kinds of political impetus that drew Brighouse to race equality as an issue. Yet Brighouse's long professional history included work with black communities during his time with ILEA in London. In Birmingham during the 1990s race equality bodies such as brap (Birmingham Race Action Partnership) lobbied for race equality to become a policy priority and their position was strengthened by the publication of Gillborn and Gipps' (1996) Ofsted report on race equality in schools (the publication of which was delayed until the intervention of the Commission for Racial Equality). It is also worth noting that ethnic performance data was only gathered nationally from 2002 (the year before the launch of the London Challenge), in direct response to the Macpherson Report and the RRAA (2000). In unpacking the 'evidence' discourse, therefore, ethnic performance data might best be described as a tool for policymakers to address race equality, rather than as a driver per se.
Equity and performance
However, if race equality policy was momentarily buoyed by New Labour's 'high performance/ high equity' agenda, contradictions soon became apparent. For, as Ball (2008) has pointed out, improving overall performance and closing ethnic gaps are not the same thing and do not necessarily occur in tandem. Archer and Francis (2007) argued that by the latter half of New Labour's administration, high performance had taken precedence over closing ethnic gaps (see also Tomlinson, 2005) . As the influence of Macpherson faded, race equality issues tended to be framed in terms of tackling 'under-achievement'; the direct focus on institutional racism urged in Macpherson (1999) and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) was superseded by a 'colour-blind' take on educational standards (see Alexander and Arday, 2015) .
Several participants pointed to a shift in emphasis between performance and equity in education policy between Macpherson and the end of the New Labour government in 2010.
Sir Keith Ajegbo, educational consultant, former head teacher and author of the DfES review, (Ajegbo et al, 2007) , commented on the diminishing of race equality criteria in Ofsted's inspection remit and the consequent slippage of race equality work in schools. Ajegbo argued that the Diversity and Citizenship report, commissioned under Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , set an agenda for citizenship education in which cultural diversity and social justice were integral. Importantly, the 14 citizenship agenda was supported by Ofsted's infrastructure. As such, said Ajegbo, it was deemed to be 'inside' school standards criteria, an area in which Ofsted inspectors took interest.
Diversity and Citizenship in the Curriculum
However, under Blair's successor Gordon Brown (2007-2010) the emphasis on plurality in the citizenship agenda was displaced by a putative focus on 'British values' (see Osler, 2009 ).
This represented a significant retreat. There was also a suggestion by at least two interviewees (one a former Education minister) that head teachers' lobbies played a role in the marginalisation of race equality issues towards the end of the Labour government. Civil servant 'Celia' participated in focus groups with influential head teachers:
…head teachers …used to come and advise (DfES). I remember this conversation … that race wasn't such a big issue. Things had 'changed'. Things were changing sufficiently and it wasn't such a big issue.
('Celia', civil servant and academic)
The deprioritising of race equality in the latter part of the New Labour administration was also referred to in an interview with civil servant Peter Wanless, who reflected on the fate of his report on black children and school exclusions. Getting It; Getting It Right (DfES, 2006) was enthusiastically received by black parents and campaigners but, in Wanless' view, remained marginal to DfES' work on achievement and school improvement and therefore did not garner the 'intensive kind of follow-through' needed to embed policy. Community-driven approaches to race and education had become squeezed by the universal focus on literacy and numeracy within the school improvement strategy:
…it wasn't sufficiently connected to a central drive of Government policy and priorities …If the report had been on doubling A-grades at maths …politicians would have leapt all over (it).
(Peter Wanless, ex-DfES)
From New Labour to the Coalition
If Diversity and Citizenship retained some small purchase within schools and the inspection framework in the latter days of New Labour, under the succeeding Conservative-Liberal …the government …took it out of the Ofsted agenda... I think, personally, (Gove) didn't understand …didn't believe it …and the reason he gave was that he wanted schools to concentrate on the key performance targets -Maths, English, Scienceand any of this wider education stuff should be ditched... he created a very, very narrow agenda').
Ted Cantle (Institute of Community Cohesion)
The RRE study included an interview with 'Jo', an Ofsted inspector. 'Jo' also attested to shift in the status of race within Ofsted's framework in the period described by Ajegbo. In the immediate post -Macpherson period (after 1999 -Macpherson period (after -2000 every registered Ofsted inspector was required to complete a training course on inclusion that included reading anti-racist research (and being tested on it). Under the Coalition race appeared in the Ofsted framework only as a footnote reference as a possible area that inspectors might choose to examine. This suggested something more than an attitudinal shift; rather, there had been a conscious dismantling of the 16 infrastructures that supported race equality policy in education, hastened by the Coalition's remodelling of the standards agenda and by what one interviewee described as 'generic', 'pseudo-scientific' models of school improvement ('...over the last five years the focus has completely gone …race …or any type of equality just isn't a factor.').
'Post-racial' and 'colour-blind' …persistent inequalities still exist … but because black kids, particularly in London, are getting higher grades …people think it's all good and it's all right …but we know that they're being excluded at high rates …that they're being diagnosed or …statemented with special educational needs at a higher rate. We know that they're less likely to get employment, more likely to get into the criminal justice system. So, you can't take one thing in isolation and say, 'Yeah… we've got it licked.'
(Derek Bardowell, ex-Stephen Lawrence Trust)
Perhaps the most pervasive feature of the interviews was the perception among stakeholders that, within both mainstream political and educational debate, issues of race and racism were considered done and dusted. Race equality issues were marginalised not just because they were perceived by policy-makers as outside of or inimical to 'quality' and 'standards' but also because they were regarded as anachronistic, as having been dealt with. Maxie Hayles commented:
There's a fallacy that we live in a post racial era and that's dangerous. It's dangerous because racism is not 'if or but'; it's an inevitable process and we're not going to get utopia.
The term 'post-racial' is problematic because it has been used to signify very different, some would say opposing, claims about the social salience of race and racism. For some commentators, the 'post-racial' denotes complex social analyses that engage with antiessentialism (Leonardo, 2011) . However, others, both in academia and politics, have used the term to claim boldly -and more simplistically -that racism has declined as a feature of social life. Note, for instance, the somewhat haughty terms used in 2012 by then UK Prime Minister David Cameron in 2012 to dismiss, as unnecessary effort, the equalities impact tests introduced in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000: 'We have smart people in Whitehall who consider equalities issues while they're making the policy. We don't need all this extra tick-box stuff' (Cameron, cited in BBC, 2012) .
One of the most striking remarks made in the project interviews was voiced by Baroness Doreen Lawrence. As a result of her family's lengthy campaign over police mishandling of the investigation of her son's murder, Lawrence has in many ways become an iconic figure, elevated to the House of Lords and publicly lauded for her campaigning work around racial
justice. Yet her comments on the status of race equality policy in the Coalition period were unambiguous:
'…race isn't on the Government agenda, they don't address race whatsoever.'
(Baroness Doreen Lawrence, campaigner and writer)
This was a conclusion echoed in a comment on the Coalition government by 'Howard', a youth worker and former advisor to Boris Johnson during the latter's term as London Mayor Participants suggested that this 'fallacious' but powerful 'post-racial' discourse operated by portraying concerns about race equality as outmoded, as an anxiety from which society needed to 'move on'. Anti-racism was increasingly associated in public debate with the past, with unnecessary discontent and with special pleading. Joy Warmington, CEO of the Birmingham's independent equalities and human rights organisation brap commented:
It's almost like we felt as a society that we'd done the equality stuff, we'd done the race equality stuff… (Joy Warmington, CEO, brap equalities and human rights)
If the race equality 'stuff' has been 'done', then it can become located a bogus concern.
Professor Heidi Safia Mirza, an academic and appointee to New Labour's task force on 18 educational standards in 1997, commented on the way in which 'colour-blind' discourses work to impugn the motives of those arguing for continued action against racial inequality:
…there is this sense in which …race is (seen as) something that only the bitter and twisted talk about, only the disillusioned, only those who want a special handout, only those who want special favours… I think that's the common sense kind of way in which it works out: that we're kind of post-equality because we've achieved equality.
(Professor Heidi Safia Mirza, academic, former advisor on educational standards)
Participants identified phenomena that they felt were commonly used to imply 'closure' on race issues. These included improvements in attainment in London schools (as noted by Derek Bardowell, above); the visibility of an emergent BME middle-class in the UK; even the presidency of Barack Obama. Gargi Bhattacharyya identified an inversion mobilised to regulate discussion of racial inequality, whereby -in an ostensibly 'post-racial' world -those who contest racism are depicted as the source of the problem:
…the discourse of anti-essentialism and the constructedness of race has been so effectively taken over by the other side that to name racism becomes racist … If you say, 'this is racism' that means all you can see is race. 'I don't see race. You see race because you're a racist' … The script has been very effective in terms of silencing discussion of racism …and I think (that) has been very eagerly taken up by people in authority …because it allows… things to be returned to interpersonal relations and racism to not be spoken about and nothing about institutional practice to be spoken about.
(Professor Gargi Bhattacharyya, trade unionist and academic)
Her argument is comparable with arguments made by, for instance, by Khan (2016) in the UK (and Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich, 2011, in the USA) that social construction theses originally developed as critical analyses of race have increasingly been employed to justify a strategic 'colour-blindness'. In short, if race is taken as an 'unreal' category, then attempts to understand social inequalities in terms of race are invalid, misguided or simply inverse racism. Anti-racism becomes, at best, a political dinosaur, and at worst, the hobby horse of the bitter and twisted.
Macpherson: rise and fall?
Some participants suggested that the evasion of issues of race and racism was a default position, strongly embedded in England's policy sphere. They suggested pessimistically that education and social policy would always seek return to a racialised status quo, maintaining racial inequality at manageable levels ('racism is not if or but; it's an inevitable process', Gillborn (2008) has argued that the public sector duties initiated by the RRAA (2000) comprised the most powerful ever manifestation of race equality policy in Britain. Almost all of the stakeholder interviewees reflected on the impact of the RRAA (2000), both in terms of specific policy and in terms of its wider impact on public debate. One of the reasons that
Macpherson resonated with many stakeholders was the report's willingness to name institutional racism. However, embrace of the concept within organisations was followed, some suggested, by a bureaucratic appropriation that produced more rhetoric than action.
They recognised the value of Macpherson's initial definition of institutional racism, insofar as it interrogated organisational cultures and structures, as opposed merely to condemning individual prejudice. Over time, however, the RRAA (2000)'s bureaucratic approaches to examining practices encouraged superficial, performative responses:
…for many organisations and individuals …like ourselves …that had been arguing that [racism] is more than just the odd individual here and there, it was really good to be able to 'out' organisations in a sense -but I think we were very simplistic about the mechanism that we were going to use to address such a complex issue and that's the problem, you know, the complexity.
(Joy Warmington, CEO, brap equalities and human rights)
Gargi Bhattacharyya also claimed that bureaucratisation had had a deleterious effect upon … a farcical …moment of various institutions saying, 'we're institutionally racist'… it seemed to be fashionable to claim institutional racism. It didn't seem to be that fashionable to do very much about it.
(Rob Berkeley, Director of Runnymede Trust, 2009-14) Gus John, one of the most experienced of the participants, whose research and campaigning on race issues stretches back to the late 1960s, spoke in similar terms to Berkeley, noting that 'for many being institutionally racist was like a badge of honour …We've held our hands up.
We admit it and we're working towards goodness.' Academic Heidi Safia Mirza also offered a revisionist take on the 'iconic' place of Macpherson and the RRAA (2000):
…it's meant to be this iconic moment but …it solidified racism in new ways. We had the …speech acts, performativity of anti-racism …(Organisations) invoke the term 'institutional racism' …they're seen as 'doing' race and that means …they've tackled the issue …the technologies of concealment become more difficult to reveal because the language is there but the very policy mechanisms themselves, have solidified racism. So, we're in this Catch 22. …go back to Macpherson …at that point you got the recognition of institutionalised racism …institutionalised inequality, and so you were able to have those conversations and you were able to argue to do things about them. All of that's eroded. You know, again if you raise that issue you're again thought of as a mad person, which you probably were prior to Macpherson.
For interviewees such as Professor Sally Tomlinson, a pioneer in research on race and education in Britain, the silence on race equality in education policy was neither accidental nor simply due to a lack of managerial skill but a deliberate political retreat. Discussion of race, let alone institutional racism, has become too politically costly:
…the immigration debate has made any notion of discussing race, immigration, refugees, asylum seekers, whatever, it's a toxic brew and so I think at the moment we're really caught in that and those of us who have been in it a long time are, I think, …quite horrified.
(Professor Sally Tomlinson, academic, researcher on race and SEN)
In addition to contemporary 'toxic' debates on immigration, asylum and multiculturalism, interviewees such as Gargi Bhattacharyya and Patrick Roach (Deputy General Secretary of teachers' union NASUWT) referred to the (re)emergence in education and social policy of a discourse of 'white working-class' failure and a parallel discourse of derision around multiculturalism (see analyses by, for example, Garner, 2010; Warmington and Grosvenor, 2011) . Increasingly dominant since the early 2000s, this policy discourse holds that white working-class children are the fraction most poorly served by schools -and that their position has been exacerbated by the supposed priority given to BME pupils' achievement in the 1980s and 1990s. For Bhattacharyya, this is a nativist discourse -one in which there is discursive and material contest over the entitlement to resources such as education. ('White people are still being badly served because all regular people are being badly served but then that becomes available as a kind of counter-rhetoric, in order to say, "Oh look, these… darkies taking up all the public space… they're getting more than us."'). For Gus John, this pattern of retreat from radical action on race is long entrenched in politics and policy:
…governments throughout the decades have had one eye on what they consider to be the responsible and moral thing to do and one eye on making sure that the rest of the population didn't feel that they were being taken out of their comfort zone… (Gus John, Communities Empowerment Network)
John's conclusion was a restatement of perhaps the most pervasive theme of the stakeholder interviews: that the vagaries of race equality policy in education could only be understood in relation to the wider politics of race, the wider history of race in Britain.
Conclusion
The beginning of the 21 st century marked a high point of progress against racism in Britain. Since then multicultural Britain has been under attack by government policies 23 and vitriolic press campaigns with an intensity unmatched by anything since at least the 1970s.
( Kundnani, 2007: 180) The voices in the current paper comprise a powerful counter-narrative to the kind of education policy rhetoric that, according to Archer and Francis (2007: 1) , 'denies racism as a potential cause of differences in achievement and hides inequalities within congratulatory public statements.' The narratives explored here are sometimes pessimistic but that very pessimism may generate critical questions about the standing of race in education policy. For race does not simply disappear from policy discourse; ostensibly colour-blind policy may still rest upon deeply racialized notions, even if it does not name race and racism. This paper …I think that post-Stephen-Lawrence phase was a period of awareness. And I think we've gone back since then. We might even be in a worse place. Because before
Stephen Lawrence, black people were visible as the possible recipients of racism. Now they're actually invisible as the possible recipients of racism...
It is a commonly heard complaint among longstanding campaigners (described by Sally
Tomlinson as 'those of us who have been in it a long time'), albeit often confined to the level of corridor conversations, rarely surfacing in published papers. The 'stakeholder' voices are significant because of the longevity of their involvement in race and social justice issues (and it is also worth noting that some of the career politicians interviewed for the project drew not dissimilar depictions). Their narratives bear similarities with recent critiques of education policy that suggest not so much a post-racial field but a field in which education and social policy discourses have been de-racialized, subsumed under issues such as underachievement (Warmington, 2014) .
Neither should our 'stakeholders' be dismissed as dinosaurs. In Ghosts of My Life, his collection of writings on truncated social and cultural progress, the late Mark Fisher contended that Twenty-First Century culture is afflicted by 'anachronism and inertia' but that this social stasis 'has been buried behind a superficial frenzy of "newness", of perpetual movement' (Fisher, 2014: 6) . Few sectors are as afflicted by frenzied newness as education, with its mantras of change, choice and reform. This perception of progress halted is not born out of the simpler failure of old folks to grasp new social arrangements; on the contrary, it is,
Fisher argues, symptomatic of frustration among progressives with 'the sheer persistence of recognisable forms' (Fisher, 2014: 7) . In this light, the reflections offered in interviews by these longstanding activists and experts may be read not as resistance to the 'new and sexy', but as credible analyses of the persistence of racialized social order.
